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Antoinette Besier*
This article examines the development of the tort of private nuisance in New Zealand, with 
particular reference to the impact of the Resource Management Act 1991.  The challenges 
confronting, and remedies available to, potential nuisance plaintiffs are contrasted with those 
provided for under the Act.  Case studies of potential nuisance situations sourced from local 
authority files are used to illustrate some likely approaches to nuisance situations.  The author 
argues that recent cases such as Hawkes Bay Protein Ltd v Davidson are sending the tort of private 
nuisance down the path of obsolescence. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is often assumed that the tort of private nuisance plays a complementary role to the 
environmental protection statutes, stepping in to protect landowner interests when local authorities1 
fail in their duty.2 I question this assumption, and reach the conclusion that the tort of private 
nuisance is largely redundant, if not obsolete, in the New Zealand context.  
I conclude that the tort is largely redundant for two main reasons. First, the expansive 
application of the statutory environmental management framework in New Zealand provided by the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) has denied private nuisance a residual support role. 
Secondly, the tort's own internal developments have served to constrain its application.  
  
*  Submitted for the LLB(Hons) degree at Victoria University of Wellington (supervisor: Katrine Evans).  
Winner of the Robert Orr McGechan Prize in 2003. 
1  "Local authority" includes regional councils and territorial authorities; see Resource Management Act 1991, 
s 3. 
2  Conor Gearty "The Place of Private Nuisance in a Modern Law of Torts" (1989) 48 CLJ 214, 217. 
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My work experience in the environmental sector using the RMA triggered my interest in this 
subject. At no stage in my seven years' work experience did I ever encounter the use of the tort. In 
addition, there appears to be a dearth of research regarding the relationship between private 
nuisance, the RMA, and the role that the tort plays today. There was an opportunity, therefore, to 
examine the interplay between the tort of private nuisance and the RMA and to discover the position 
of the tort in New Zealand. 
At the outset it is important to note the limitations of this article. I have focused my research on 
private nuisance in relation to non-physical damage, described by Lord Westbury as "sensible 
personal discomfort".3 It is in this category of harm that the tort of private nuisance has the greatest 
potential to be used in a support role to the RMA.  
This article begins by addressing the substance and applicability of the tort of private nuisance. 
This is followed by a discussion of the RMA, New Zealand's statutory environmental management 
framework, with particular attention paid to the role of local authorities. The application of the 
concept of reverse sensitivity is critical in reducing the role of private nuisance and is discussed in 
some detail. Five potential nuisance cases are examined in order to determine why they were 
resolved without recourse to the tort. In the final section I focus on the possible demise of private 
nuisance and query whether this is desirable.  
II PRIVATE NUISANCE 
A The Substance and Applicability of Private Nuisance 
Leading academics such as Fleming and Newark have observed that a definition of the tort of 
private nuisance is not easy to find. Fleming declared that the tort defies "rational exposition"4 while 
Newark pronounced that the tort "comprises a mass of material which proves so intractable to 
definition and analysis that it immediately betrays its mongrel origins."5  
Private nuisance covers a wide range of harms but the key unifying feature of the tort resides in 
the general kind of harm that is caused rather than any particular class of conduct.6 There are three 
kinds of private nuisance: nuisance by encroachment on a neighbour's land; nuisance by direct 
physical injury to a neighbour's land; and nuisance by interference with a neighbour's quiet 
enjoyment of his or her land.7  
  
3  St Helens Smelting v Tipping (1865) 11 HLC 642 (HL) cited in Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] 1 
WLR 683, 690 (QB) Veale J. 
4  John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9 ed, The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1998) 457. 
5  F H Newark "The Boundaries of Nuisance" (1949) 65 LQR 480, 480. 
6  Fleming, above n 4, 457. 
7  Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655, 695 (HL) Lord Berwick. 
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As stated earlier, this article focuses on the latter kind of nuisance, being harm that results in 
personal discomfort. The main reason for this is that liability for physical harm in terms of property 
and personal injury is generally found outside of the tort of private nuisance. The tort of negligence 
is commonly used for situations involving physical harm to property and, in the case of personal 
injury, the accident compensation scheme is able to provide relief.8 The rule established in Rylands 
v Fletcher9 is also able to provide a remedy in the case of physical damage and the tort of trespass 
can be used in situations where there is a nuisance caused by encroachment on land. Indeed, today a 
"typical case of private nuisance is one concerned with interference with the enjoyment of land."10  
Private nuisance, therefore, provides a sound basis for determining legal liability in situations 
involving non-physical harm. However, I intend to examine whether or not the tort is able to 
undertake this role in the face of the comprehensive statutory environmental protection framework 
provided by the RMA. While the RMA will not protect activities that cause physical damage to a 
neighbouring property, it may provide for an activity that causes significant personal discomfort to 
the occupier of a neighbouring property. 
B Elements of the Tort  
Private nuisance protects those with proprietary interests in land.11 Whether private nuisance 
will provide a remedy for interference with the occupier's use or enjoyment of his or her land 
depends on the scales of reasonableness.12 The level of annoyance and discomfort must be 
substantial and exceed the bounds of the normal "give and take" expected of neighbours.13 The 
nuisance must also be caused by an emission from outside the plaintiff's land,14 such as the 
generation of toxic fumes from a factory,15 noise from a military aircraft base,16 or the extraordinary 
glare produced by a neighbouring building.17 Recently, in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, Lord Goff 
emphasised that the nuisance must be caused by an "emanation" such as "noise, dirt, fumes, a 
  
8  Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001. 
9  Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
10  Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, above n 7, 692 Lord Goff. 
11  People with title to land, see Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, above n 7. 
12  Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood [1984] 1 NZLR 525, 531 (HC) Hardie Boys J. 
13  Kennaway v Thompson [1980] 3 All ER 329, 333 (CA) Lawton LJ. 
14  Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, above n 7, 685 Lord Goff. 
15  St Helens Smelting v Tipping, above n 3. 
16  Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 793; [2003] EGLR 121 (QB). 
17  Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood, above n 12. 
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noxious smell, vibrations, and suchlike".18 This raises a question regarding whether glare can be 
considered an "emanation" by a future court.19
The court will also have to consider the character of the neighbourhood and make an assessment 
based on the "plain and sober and simple notions" of people living in the area.20 The locality is an 
important consideration in determining what is a reasonable activity  For instance, what is 
acceptable in an industrial context may be unacceptable in a residential area.21 Moreover, the court 
may make a distinction between different types of residential areas; what may "be a nuisance in 
Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey."22
Liability in private nuisance is not discharged by the exercise of due care.23 The utility of the 
defendant's conduct,24 the fact that the plaintiff came to the nuisance,25 and the existence of, and 
compliance with, planning permissions26 are not defences to an action in private nuisance. Damages 
are generally not recoverable unless the plaintiff is able to prove that the harm caused by the 
defendant was reasonably foreseeable.27  
The tort of private nuisance thus attempts to protect property rights and achieve a balance 
between competing land uses. The tort appears to have great potential to be used for environmental 
protection in conjunction with the RMA as noted by Gearty:28  
The textbooks tell us that private nuisance is an environmental tort, and they are right. There is nothing 
better in the common law for getting sewage out of rivers, reducing unwanted noise and cleansing the 
atmosphere of acid smuts, smoke and other pollutants. Its remedies – the injunction and damages – are 
the strongest that the courts have to offer. They respond to the extent of the harm done, not as in 
negligence, to the culpability of the harmer. 
  
18  Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, above n 7, 685 Lord Goff. 
19  Geoff McLay "The Once and Future Tort of Nuisance" (1997) NZLJ 222, 223. 
20  Walter v Selfe (1851) 4 De G & Sm 315, 322 cited in Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood, above n 12, 531. 
21  St Helens Smelting v Tipping, above n 3, 650 Lord Westbury. 
22  Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, 865 (CA) Jessel MR. 
23  Fleming, above n 4, 473. 
24  Fleming, above n 4, 471. 
25  Sturges v Bridgman, above n 22. 
26  Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19 (CA). 
27  Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v The Miller Steamship Co & Or ("The Wagon Mound (No 2)") [1967] 1 AC 
617, 639 (PC) Lord Reid.  
28  Gearty, above n 2, 216. 
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However, Gearty concludes that the tort has been "markedly underutilised" as an environmental 
tort and explains the tort's failure in relation to internal deficiencies.29 These include definitional 
problems in relation to the tort's lack of distinctness, structural issues such as costs, locus standi and 
the burden of proof and, lastly, the doctrinal dimension of the tort, particularly the relationship 
between nuisance and negligence. Gearty concludes that the tort needs to rediscover its own 
principles before it can turn its attention to the protection of the environment.30 While I agree that 
the tort is underutilised, Gearty's emphasis on change within the tort is probably not applicable to 
the New Zealand context. The utility of the tort depends to a large extent on the external statutory 
regime, as the following study on case law indicates. 
C Case Law  
Relevant case law falls into two groups: private nuisance claims involving personal discomfort 
and RMA cases that affect the application of the tort. 
1 Personal discomfort cases 
There are few private nuisance cases in New Zealand that involve non-physical damage claims. 
In Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood the tort of private nuisance proved amenable to dealing with 
the extraordinary glare produced by the glass verandah of a neighbouring building.31 This case 
occurred prior to the enactment of the RMA but it is worth noting that glare from a building is an 
environmental effect and that the RMA enforcement provisions could be applied to such a 
situation.32  However, private nuisance in this instance achieved a sound outcome and this case 
highlights the valuable support role that the tort is able to play when a local authority fails in their 
duty to protect neighbourhood amenity. Here the effect of glare was not addressed by the local 
authority through the planning control process which approved of the building's construction.33 
Hardie Boys J demonstrated the inherent flexibility of the tort in providing a creative remedy to the 
situation: the installation of blinds on the plaintiff's building paid for by the defendant.34
The tort was also successfully applied in Matheson v Northcote College where a school was 
found liable for the actions of its pupils who created a nuisance to the owners of a neighbouring 
property.35 The pupils hit golf balls and threw firecrackers and litter into the plaintiff's property. 
  
29  Gearty, above n 2, 218. 
30  Gearty, above n 2, 218. 
31  Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood, above n 12. 
32  See Part III A The Environmental Management Framework. 
33  Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood, above n 12, 534. 
34  Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood, above n 12, 536; see also Ursula Cheer "Private Nuisance Clarified" 
(1997) 5 Torts LJ 1, 15. 
35  Matheson v Northcote College [1975] 2 NZLR 106 (SC) McMullin J. 
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They also frequently trespassed on the property. These actions caused the plaintiff considerable 
annoyance in addition to physical damage to their property. While Matheson is possibly not a good 
example of the tort being applied to a personal discomfort situation, as the claim also included 
physical damage and trespass, the case does demonstrate the important backup role of the tort of 
private nuisance.  
The most relevant case for the purposes of this paper is the recent case of Hawkes Bay Protein 
Limited v Davidson involving noxious odours.36 Davidson would appear to indicate that private 
nuisance remains a solid option for relief where the RMA fails to resolve a nuisance situation. A 
closer analysis, however, reveals that this conclusion is incorrect.  
The Davidsons were owners of a wool storage business in an industrial area of Napier.  They 
brought a successful claim in private nuisance against their neighbour, Hawkes Bay Protein Limited. 
The latter owned a fish and meat rendering plant which generated "noxious and pungent" odours 
that caused the Davidsons significant discomfort. At times, the odour caused Mr Davidson to be 
physically ill and the Davidsons were forced to relocate their business after the Hawkes Bay 
Regional Council failed to control the odour problem. They experienced considerable difficulty in 
selling the property and eventually sold at a price that fell well short of the government valuation.  
Judge Willy in the District Court held that the odour emissions from the rendering plant 
constituted an actionable nuisance.37 Damages were awarded for anxiety and distress ($3,000 to Mr 
Davidson and $1,500 to Mrs Davidson) together with $52,000, being the difference between the 
value of their property and its sale price, which was "attributable to the nuisance created and 
continued by the defendant."38 Judge Willy also awarded costs of $11,000 to the plaintiffs. 
The defendants appealed to the High Court regarding the finding that there was an actionable 
nuisance and the award of damages. Gendall J upheld the finding of the District Court regarding an 
actionable nuisance. However, Gendall J allowed the appeal against the quantum of damages on the 
basis that when the nuisance relates to interference with the enjoyment of a property, the primary 
remedy for a plaintiff is an injunction, not damages. Thus general damages were reduced to 
$12,000, given the plaintiffs' failure to seek an injunction.  
The High Court's treatment of damages in Davidson does not augur well for the use of the tort of 
private nuisance in a complementary role to the RMA. Regardless of the tort's own internal 
developments, the RMA cases discussed below demonstrate the submergence of private nuisance 
within the statutory framework of the RMA.  
  
36  Hawkes Bay Protein Limited v Davidson (28 June 2002) HC Nap AP 30/01 Gendall J. 
37  Davidson, above n 36, 58 para 232. 
38  Davidson, above n 36, 59 para 235. 
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2 Resource Management Act 1991 cases 
Cases brought under the RMA have an effect on the application of the tort. For instance, the rule 
established by Sturges v Bridgman that the plaintiff's coming to the nuisance is no defence to an 
actionable nuisance, has been restricted by Auckland Regional Council v Auckland City Council.39 
This case addressed the role of local authorities in the regulation of land uses. Judge Sheppard held 
that failure to consider "the effects [on] those who come to the nuisance, would be to fail to perform 
the functions prescribed for territorial authorities."40 Auckland Regional Council assists local 
authorities in placing restrictions on new land uses in order to ensure that a nuisance situation does 
not arise.  
Baragwanath J in the High Court supported Judge Sheppard's regulatory approach in Ports of 
Auckland v Auckland City Council.41 This case comprised a judicial review action regarding the 
decision of the Auckland City Council to grant resource consent for a residential development in the 
immediate vicinity of the port. The port company argued that the neighbouring residents would be 
subjected to unreasonable noise generated by its port activities and would be likely to seek 
injunctive relief in a private nuisance action. It was also argued that the Council should have 
consulted with the company as an "affected party" and applied noise insulation conditions to the 
resource consent in order to protect the residents from the noise generated by the port.42 The port 
company was successful and the Court directed that the Council redraft the conditions of the 
resource consent.  
The Ports of Auckland decision endorsed British authority regarding the relationship between 
planning permission and private nuisance.43 Baragwanath J approved of the judgments of Pill and 
Gibson LJJ in Hunter44 and Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd45 respectively. These judgments held that 
planning permission does not have the same effect as statutory authority.46 The defence of statutory 
authority may apply when a nuisance is the result of a project that has been authorised by 
Parliament. Any harm that is the inevitable result of that construction does not give rise to an 
actionable nuisance, provided that the undertaker has carried out the works with all reasonable 
  
39  Auckland Regional Council v Auckland City Council [1997] NZRMA 205 (EC) Judge Sheppard. 
40  Auckland Regional Council v Auckland City Council, above n 39, para 108. 
41  Ports of Auckland v Auckland City Council [1999] 1 NZLR 600, 612 (HC) Baragwanath J. 
42  Resource Management Act 1991, s 94(1)(c)(ii), s 105(1)(a). 
43  Planning permission is the same as resource consent approval under the Resource Management Act 1991. 
44  Hunter v Canary Wharf, above n 7, 695. 
45  Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd, above n 26. 
46  Ports of Auckland v Auckland City Council, above n 41, 611. 
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regard and care for the interests of others. This is referred to as the Allen Principle47 and Lord 
Cooke applied it to the Canary Wharf development in Hunter.48 However, planning permission does 
not have the same effect as statutory authority, and a local authority cannot authorise a nuisance.49 It 
is clear, therefore, that a resource consent will not provide a defence to a claim in nuisance. 
Baragwanath J also held that compliance with a district plan rule does not afford any defence in a 
nuisance action.50  
Baragwanath J argued that private nuisance should be merged within the statutory framework. 
Local authority decision-makers should refer to the common law in addition to the RMA at the time 
each statutory decision is made.51 Thus, the main conclusion that can be drawn from Ports of 
Auckland is that responsibility rests on local authorities to ensure that a nuisance situation does not 
arise in the first place.52  
The direction to local authorities by the High Court in Ports of Auckland has overruled the 
approach taken earlier in the same year by the Environment Court in Auckland City Council v 
Auckland Regional Council.53 In the latter case, the Environment Court held that a local authority is 
not required to consider whether a decision might also be actionable in tort.54 This decision related 
to the City Council's appeal regarding the Regional Council's refusal to grant consent to a number of 
applications for the Britomart transport development. The Court rejected the argument made by 
supporters of the Regional Council's decision that the Council was entitled to refuse consent, as this 
would give rise to an actionable nuisance.55  
Several points can be drawn from the cases outlined above. A local authority cannot authorise a 
nuisance.  In addition, compliance with resource consent conditions or district or regional plan 
provisions cannot be used as a defence in a private nuisance action. However, the most notable 
feature demonstrated by the review of case law is that local authorities are responsible for ensuring 
that a nuisance situation does not arise by protecting existing land use activities from competing 
land uses. In Ports of Auckland the High Court has demonstrated a willingness to hold local 
  
47  Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1980] QB 156 (CA) Cumming-Bruce LJ.  
48  Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, above n 7, 722. 
49  Ports of Auckland, above n 41, 611; Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd, above n 26, 28 Staughton LJ. 
50  Ports of Auckland, above n 41, 611. 
51  Ports of Auckland, above n 41, 609. 
52  Ports of Auckland, above n 41, 613. 
53  Auckland City Council v Auckland Regional Council [1999] NZRMA 145, para 108 (EC) Judge Sheppard.  
54  Auckland City Council, above n 53, para 108. 
55  Auckland City Council, above n 53, para 107-9. 
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authorities to account for failing to ensure that existing land uses are protected from potential 
nuisance actions. The following section expands on these points by assessing the impact of the 
statutory environmental protection framework on the tort of private nuisance. 
III THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT 1991  
The marginal note to section 23 of the RMA states that "other legal requirements are not 
affected" by the RMA. In doing so, this section has preserved common law actions.56  In the 
following section I will outline how, despite section 23 of the RMA, the application of the Act has 
left very little room for private nuisance to operate in a support role. 
A The Environmental Management Framework 
The RMA is a comprehensive environmental management statute. It replaced 25 natural 
resource and planning statutes and modified and repealed 150 laws and regulations with a "single, 
seamless and ambitious piece of law."57 The purpose of the RMA is the "sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources".58 The RMA requires sustainable management to be carried out in a 
way which avoids, remedies or mitigates "any adverse effects of activities on the environment".59 
"Environment" is defined broadly by section 2 of the RMA to include people, communities, and 
social and economic conditions as well as ecosystems and amenity and cultural values.  
The definition of environment is so wide that it allows RMA decision-makers to consider the 
full gamut of economic and social consequences of activities.60 As a result, the RMA has enabled 
local authorities to apply planning controls to a wide range of activities.61 This has resulted in a high 
level of regulation being applied to the use of land and other natural resources.62  
  
56  David Williams (ed) Environmental and Resource Management Law (2 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 
390. 
57  David Young Values as Law: the History and Efficacy of the RMA (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 
2001) 1. 
58  Resource Management Act 1991, s 5(1). 
59  Resource Management Act 1991, s 5(2)(c). 
60  Simon Upton, Helen Atkins and Gerard Willis "Section 5 Re-visited: A Critique of Skelton and Memon's 
Analysis" (2002) 3(10) Resource Management Journal 10, 14. 
61  Planning controls are promulgated under local authorities and apply through district and regional plans: 
Resource Management Act 1991 ss 30-31.  
62  Upton, above n 60, 20. 
572 (2004) 35 VUWLR 
B Planning Controls 
Compliance with planning regulations is the first significant step in the prevention of actionable 
nuisances. Regulations generally control the location of land use activities and also set standards 
regarding building height, noise emission levels, discharge of contaminants and the like.63  
The second step in preventing a nuisance comes through the resource consent process. Local 
authority decision-makers decide whether an activity that does not comply with the plan can be 
granted resource consent in order to be established.64 An assessment of the proposed activity's 
"actual and potential effects on the environment" is made in accordance with section 104 of the 
RMA. Given the broad definition of environment in the RMA, the assessment can include a wide 
range of effects including the effects of the proposed activity on the neighbourhood.65  
While it is clear that the application of planning controls will mean that the occurrence of a 
private nuisance situation will be relatively rare, what is of concern is whether tort can be used in a 
situation where the local authority has failed to provide adequate protection. The following 
discussion addresses this point. 
C Substitutes for Private Nuisance Remedies  
The RMA does not define "nuisance" or address civil law remedies. However, the Act provides 
for a range of enforcement procedures that can be utilised to end a nuisance situation. These include 
abatement notices, enforcement orders and directions regarding excessive noise.66 These actions 
provide a remedy similar to an injunction and can require people to stop undertaking an activity. 
Abatement notices and enforcement orders are issued to ensure compliance with the RMA or plan 
regulations. These can be applied to a wide range of situations where activities generate 
unacceptable effects. 
Abatement notices are issued by local authority enforcement officers and cannot be applied for 
by members of the public.67 From the perspective of a potential plaintiff, an abatement notice issued 
by an enforcement officer of the local authority represents an expedient option to solve a nuisance 
problem. Neither cost nor risk of legal liability is incurred on his or her behalf and the notice can 
order a potential defendant to stop a nuisance or refrain from starting one.  
  
63  See generally the Wellington City District Plan and Hamilton City Proposed District Plan. 
64  Resource Management Act 1991, ss 104B-104D. 
65  See generally Mobil Oil New Zealand Limited v Taupo District Council (16 December 1998) EC Taupo 
A149/98, para 54 Judge Whiting. 
66  Resource Management Act 1991, ss 314-326. 
67  Resource Management Act 1991, ss 322-325. 
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Unlike an abatement notice, an enforcement order can be initiated by any person and is issued 
by the Environment Court.68 The RMA has provided the public with a direct right to seek 
enforcement orders.69 As this option will take time to go before a hearing at the Environment Court, 
the RMA has also provided for interim enforcement orders to be issued by the Court without a 
hearing when there is an immediate risk or danger to the environment.70 This option will often 
require the applicant to give an undertaking as to damages.71 An enforcement order can also order 
the reimbursement of costs that a potential plaintiff has incurred in avoiding, remedying or 
mitigating any adverse environmental effect.72  
Other legal remedies that are available include a declaration clarifying a point of law and 
judicial review. The latter has proved a useful remedy in Ports of Auckland to protect the port 
company from any future nuisance liability by requiring the local authority to reset conditions of a 
resource consent to provide adequate noise insulation.73  
While the RMA is able to provide relief to a potential plaintiff from a nuisance situation, it is 
also important to explore how the RMA has undermined the application of the tort through its 
expansive application. The following section addresses this matter. 
D The Resource Management Act Takeover 
1 Reverse sensitivity 
Reverse sensitivity is defined as the legal vulnerability of an established activity to complaint 
from the owners of a new land use.74 It "exists where an established use produces adverse effects 
and a new use is proposed for nearby land".75 The use of this concept in RMA decision-making can 
restrict how a property owner adjacent to an established land use activity may use his or her land.  
Reverse sensitivity can provide for a potential nuisance activity to continue. An example would 
be allowing a quarry operator to continue operations unimpeded by controls that would protect 
neighbouring properties.76 Viewed from another perspective, reverse sensitivity can prevent a 
  
68  Resource Management Act 1991, ss 314-321. 
69  Williams, above n 56, 578. 
70  Resource Management Act 1991, s 320. 
71  Resource Management Act 1991, s 320(3)(b). 
72  Resource Management Act 1991, s 314(1)(d). 
73  Ports of Auckland v Auckland City Council, above n 41. 
74  Bruce Pardy and Janine Kerr "Reverse Sensitivity - the Common Law Giveth and the RMA Taketh Away" 
(1999) 3 NZJEL 93, 93. 
75  Pardy and Kerr, above n 74, 93. 
76  Rowell v Tasman District Council (12 February 1997) HC Nel CP16/95 Neazor J. 
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plaintiff from coming to the nuisance by restricting the use of the neighbouring land. An example of 
this is a local authority's refusal to allow rural residential land subdivision to proceed on land 
adjacent to a pig farm.77
The term "reverse sensitivity" does not appear in the RMA. Rather the concept has been 
developed and applied in a succession of cases by the Environment Court.78 The use of the concept 
involves a high degree of regulation regarding the location of land use activities. While such 
regulation reflects the approach used under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, Parliament 
rejected this approach in the enactment of the RMA. 79
Pardy and Kerr claim that the use of the concept of reverse sensitivity has had "significant 
consequences" for private nuisance.80 The rule established by Sturges v Bridgman,81 that coming to 
the nuisance is no defence, has been rendered meaningless through the imposition of restrictions on 
adjacent land.82 Pardy and Kerr argue that the use of the concept has allowed for adverse 
environmental impacts to continue and be protected from legitimate legal complaint.83  
Furthermore, use of the reverse sensitivity concept has introduced public interest as a 
consideration when assessing conflicting land uses.84 In private nuisance, an assessment of the 
public interest has generally been disapproved.85 Its use in resource management will mean that 
land uses providing economic or social benefits to the community will generally prevail. This was 
demonstrated in Winstone Aggregates Ltd v Papakura District Council, a case regarding a 
submission on the content of the proposed district plan.86 The quarry provided employment and an 
important source of aggregate for roads in the area. The Environment Court recognised these social 
and economic benefits and accepted the company's submission that the quarry should be protected 
from future complaint. This was achieved by the imposition of a "buffer overlay" over neighbouring 
land which restricted the use of this land to activities that would not conflict with the quarry. 
  
77  CJ McMillan Ltd v Waimakariri District Council (11 August 1998) EC ChCh C87/98 Judge Jackson. 
78  Pardy and Kerr, above n 74, 94. 
79  Geoffrey Palmer Environment: The International Challenge (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1995) 
145. 
80  Pardy and Kerr, above n 74, 96. 
81  Sturges v Bridgman above n 22, 865.  
82  Pardy and Kerr, above n 74, 98. 
83  Pardy and Kerr, above n 74, 101. 
84  Pardy and Kerr, above n 74, 103. 
85  Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood, above n 12, 535. 
86  Winstone Aggregates Ltd v Papakura District Council (14 August 1998) EC Ak, A96/98 Judge Whiting. 
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The High Court has supported the position of the Environment Court and has held that if the 
effects of some activities cannot be reasonably internalised through restrictions and controls then 
"restrictions on other sites might be appropriate".87 Using this reasoning, Baragwanath J concluded 
that the port company could not be expected to reduce its noise emissions in order to reduce its 
effect on neighbouring residents.  
It is clear that there are certain activities such as airports and seaports that are required by the 
community which cannot internalise all of their adverse effects. However, Pardy and Kerr argue that 
if a claim in private nuisance exists then there is no reason to justify protection of an activity under 
the RMA. Similarly, if no claim in private nuisance exists, then there is no need to provide 
protection using the concept of reverse sensitivity whereby unnecessary restrictions are placed on 
landowner rights.88  
Pardy and Kerr's argument may fail to take into account the commercial realities of business 
desire (and possible need) to minimise the risk of liability.  But it does raise an important issue 
regarding how far the public interest argument can be used to protect a potential defendant. In cases 
where the local authority has determined that it is in the public interest for an activity to continue, 
the restrictions placed on the adjacent land must be endured without compensation.89 Moreover, this 
means that the local authority, rather than an independent court, decides which landowner rights 
would prevail over the other.  
Use of the concept of reverse sensitivity has also placed greater responsibility on the local 
authority to ensure that an existing land use is protected from legal liability arising from the 
environmental effects it generates.90 If the local authority fails in this task, they will be held to 
account through judicial review. The potential defendant has the easy ride while the burden has been 
shifted to the local authority. It is difficult to understand why a potential nuisance should be 
afforded such a high level of protection and why such an encroachment on private property rights 
should be accepted.  
E Agreements to Allow for a Nuisance 
Private agreements, whether they are covenants entered on titles or less formal arrangements, 
have the effect of permitting a nuisance situation to continue. These agreements are brought about 
when there is a change in land use.  
  
87  Ports of Auckland v Auckland City Council, above n 41, 612. 
88  Pardy and Kerr, above n 74, 101. 
89  Pardy and Kerr, above n 74, 99. 
90  Ports of Auckland v Auckland City Council, above n 41, 613. 
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There are two different ways in which agreements to 'allow' a nuisance occur. The first method 
is through the resource consent process whereby a condition precluding complaints from the 
applicant (and future titleholders) is imposed as a condition of granting resource consent under 
section 105(1)(a) of the RMA. This arrangement would apply in a situation of reverse sensitivity, 
such as when an applicant was seeking to introduce a land use activity such as an airport91 or a 
quarry92 that would be sensitive to an existing use. The imposition of such a condition is likely to 
arise as the result of negotiation between the parties93 or through a District Plan requirement.94 The 
arrangement is protected against changes in ownership by binding future landowners and is recorded 
on the certificate of title. 
The second method is through a private agreement independent of the statutory processes. For 
example, a forestry company operating in the Tasman District regularly enters into agreements with 
landowners adversely affected by logging operations. Such a private agreement ends the 
landowner's right to object to the activity either as a submitter in the resource consent process or in a 
private nuisance action.95 These private agreements are not provided for in the RMA. However, the 
RMA has facilitated their use through its consultation provisions and emphasis on negotiated 
outcomes.96  
The High Court expressly approved in principle the use of such agreements in Building Industry 
Authority v Christchurch International Airport in order to deal with the competing land use interests 
of the airport and property owners wishing to construct dwellings on their rural holdings close to the 
airport.97 This decision has been carried through into the Christchurch Proposed City Plan. 
Landowners who wish to construct dwellings must enter into a covenant registered against the title 
that the use of the building "shall endure only for so long as no complaint in relation to the noise of 
aircraft using Christchurch International Airport … is made."98
A year later, the High Court in Rowell v Tasman District Council relied on Christchurch 
International Airport to approve of the use of a covenant whereby a landowner agreed to a nuisance 
  
91  Christchurch International Airport v Christchurch City Council [1997] NZRMA 145 (HC) Tipping J. 
92  Rowell, above n 76. 
93  Rowell, above n 76. 
94  City of Christchurch Proposed City Plan, 1995, Rule 2.5.7 Aircraft Noise Exposure, 4/16. 
95  Telephone interview with Jack Andrews, Co-ordinator Resource Consents, Tasman District Council (the 
author, 13 June 2003). 
96  Resource Management Act 1991, ss 93-95. 
97  Christchurch International Airport v Christchurch City Council, above n 91, 161. 
98  City of Christchurch Proposed City Plan, 1995, Rule 2.5.7 Aircraft Noise Exposure, 4/16. 
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arising from a quarry in order to obtain consent for a rural residential subdivision.99 The 
Environment Court has also recently approved the use of a resource consent condition that 
prevented any future owners from initiating court proceedings in relation to the horticultural 
activities of a neighbour.100
The use of a condition precluding complaint in resource consents appears to be limited as 
revealed by my telephone survey of senior planning officers of metropolitan local authorities.101 
Officers reported limited use and a general lack of awareness of such arrangements. An officer from 
the Tasman District Council stated that no conditions precluding complaints have been used since 
Rowell and that if any such agreements were reached it was through the initiative of the parties 
outside of the consent process.102  
It is difficult to ascertain how widespread the use of private agreements is without a 
comprehensive survey of lawyers practising in property and resource management law. However, 
council officers stated that they thought that it was likely to have occurred in some instances but that 
their use was not widespread.  
It does not appear that agreements to allow a nuisance play a significant role in diminishing the 
role of private nuisance. While such agreements restrict a property owner's access to courts to 
complain of a nuisance, property owners have been willing to pay this cost in order to live in a 
certain area, as indicated in Christchurch International Airport103 and Rowell.104  
F The Responsibility of Local Authorities 
As discussed earlier, the decision of the High Court in Ports of Auckland has ensured that it is 
the responsibility of a local authority to ensure that a nuisance does not happen in the first place.105
The recently announced district plan change by the Wellington City Council (WCC) to apply 
new noise standards for noise sensitive activities in the inner city area is a good example of a local 
authority ensuring that no nuisance arises.106 These standards will ensure that the conversion of 
  
99  Rowell, above n 76. 
100  JR's Orchard Limited v South Wairarapa District Council (16 June 2002) EC Wn RMA 1043/00 Judge 
Kenderdine. 
101 See Section VIII D 2 Personal Communications. 
102 Andrews, above n 95. 
103 Christchurch International Airport v Christchurch City Council, above n 91. 
104 Rowell, above n 76. 
105 Ports of Auckland v Auckland City Council, above n 41. 
106 Wellington City Council, Proposed District Plan Change 16 - Central Area Noise Rules, May 2003. 
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existing buildings for "noise sensitive activities" will require insulation, thereby avoiding a situation 
as occurred in 22 Ghuznee Street (addressed below).  
Thus the local authority has the unenviable task of ensuring that no nuisance arises. In summary, 
it appears that the tort of private nuisance is unable to play any kind of support role to the RMA. 
The following case studies demonstrate this point clearly. 
IV CASE STUDIES REGARDING POTENTIAL NUISANCE SITUATIONS  
A Selection of Cases Studied  
In order to assess the extent to which the RMA has eclipsed private nuisance, it is useful to 
examine how potential nuisance claims have been resolved without recourse to the tort. In 
consultation with officers from the Greater Wellington Council (GWC) and the WCC, five case 
studies were selected which represented potential nuisance claims.107 It is important to note at the 
outset that it was difficult to find appropriate case studies. Perhaps this is an indication in itself of 
how planning controls have prevented nuisance situations from arising. 
All of the case studies involve personal discomfort nuisance issues related to noise and odour. 
The five case studies are set out in Table 1.  
TABLE 1: PRIVATE NUISANCE CASE STUDIES 
Potential Defendant Emanation Potential Plaintiff 
11 Darwin Street 
(residence) 
Smoke (chip burner) Owner of neighbouring 
residence 
60 Kingsford Street 
(factory) 
Noise (extractor fan) Owners/lessees of 
neighbouring residences 
22 Ghuznee Street 
(bar/restaurant) 
Noise (live music)  Owners of residential 
apartments above (same 
building) but separate titles 
290 Cuba Street (fast food 
outlet) 
Odour (cooking food) Owners of adjacent 
residential apartment building 
48 Kemp Street (factory) Odour (industrial) Owner of adjacent residence 
  
107 Interview with Alison Box, Enforcement Officer WCC (the author, Wellington, 8 April 2003); Interview 
with Chris Keenan, Pollution Officer, Greater Wellington Council (the author, Wellington, 3 June 2003). 
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B Description of the Case Studies 
The potential nuisance situation at 11 Darwin Street related to the emission of smoke from a 
residential chip heater. A neighbouring property owner complained of thick black smoke with a 
noxious smell. The smoke was claimed to have an adverse effect on their children's health and it 
affected the use and enjoyment of their property. WCC's file on the property indicates that the 
period of complaint lasted from November 2002 to February 2003, at which time the Mayor 
informed the complainants that the WCC would not undertake any action in relation to their 
complaints. The GWC is responsible for the regulation of air discharges but they have no record of a 
complaint being lodged at this address.  
The situation at 60 Kingsford Street had a more satisfactory conclusion for the potential 
plaintiffs. The residents of the suburban adjoining area complained about the noise emissions from a 
new joinery factory located at the address. The WCC officers undertook noise measurements and 
initiated enforcement proceedings under the RMA as the level of noise exceeded District Plan 
standards. Within a short period of time the factory owners had undertaken measures to reduce noise 
emissions and no further complaints were received. 
Another noise emission case study, 22 Ghuznee Street, presented a more complex situation for 
the WCC. In May 2000 a café moved into the ground floor of a residential apartment block. The 
café played live music in the evening three to four times a week and generated a large number of 
complaints from the residents above.108 After several attempts to reduce noise emission levels, the 
WCC issued an abatement notice. The owner of the café appealed the notice to the Environment 
Court. In the interim, music continued to be played. Six months later, the Environment Court upheld 
the abatement notice, but by this stage the café owner had decided to sell his business.  
At 290 Cuba Street, the odour emissions from a fast food outlet caused some distress to the 
residents of a new apartment block on an adjacent street. The owner of the fast food business was 
resistant to making any changes that would reduce odour emissions and was critical of the 
complainants and their motivation for making the complaints. Eventually he engaged a lawyer and 
worked alongside the GWC to implement changes to reduce the emission of odour.  
The GWC took a different approach to the potential odour nuisance problem generated by a 
wool testing factory located at 48 Kemp Street. After receiving a couple of complaints from a 
neighbouring resident, the GWC investigated the factory and initiated enforcement action which 
required that the factory owners comply within a short period to reduce the "offensive and 
objectionable" odour and pay a fine of $1000. The factory owners introduced some odour mitigation 
measures and no further complaints were received. 
  
108 22 Ghuznee Street (WCC reference: 71510). 
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C Existence of Potential Nuisance Claims  
Each case supported a claim in private nuisance to a greater or lesser extent. For the purposes of 
this article, it is assumed that the potential plaintiff is an owner or tenant of the property and 
therefore satisfies the locus standi requirement of the tort. 
In all of the case studies there is an emanation in the form of odour or noise arising from the 
potential defendant's land and affecting the potential plaintiff's land. A strong case could be made 
that, in three of the case studies (48 Kemp Street, 290 Cuba Street and 60 Kingsford Street), the 
emanation amounted to a substantial and unreasonable interference with the potential plaintiff's 
enjoyment of his or her property. In relation to 48 Kemp Street and 290 Cuba Street, the odour 
emissions were noticeable to the residents of the neighbouring area during business hours (and 
evenings and weekends for 290 Cuba Street), thus being frequent and of long duration. From the 
accounts given on the files, it appears that the odour had a strong effect and made the surrounding 
area an unpleasant place to occupy.  
Similarly, the noise emissions at 60 Kingsford Street were during business hours and were of 
high intensity. However, issues arise regarding whether 22 Ghuznee Street and 11 Darwin Street can 
satisfy the requirement of substantial and unreasonable interference. While the WCC issued 
excessive noise directions and an abatement notice to the bar owners regarding the noise from the 
café, it could be argued that live music played at an entertainment venue in the evenings in an inner 
city location cannot be considered unreasonable given the context of the neighbourhood. An 
element of "give and take" may be expected in an area that serves as an entertainment district. 
Nevertheless, there remains a strong case for the apartment owners given the high level of 
interference the music had on the enjoyment of their property, particularly disruption to their sleep 
patterns. Five apartments were temporarily vacated by their owners due to the level of noise 
interference.109
At 11 Darwin Street it is unclear that the level of interference was unreasonable given the 
limited duration of the pungent smoke emission. Council officers' investigations concluded that the 
smoke was a problem for a very short time. The Mayor stated in a letter to the complainant "other 
than smoke from the initial start-up period [of the chip burner], I am satisfied with the officer's 
assessment that a smoke nuisance does not exist".110  
In all cases, the potential nuisance was continued by the potential defendants after they were 
made aware of the interference caused to the potential plaintiff. Similarly, the harm incurred by the 
potential plaintiffs was reasonably foreseeable. Having established that the case studies represent 
potential nuisance claims, I now turn to discuss the main findings of the case study research. 
  
109 22 Ghuznee Street, above. 
110 11 Darwin Street (WCC: 171504). 
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D Main Findings  
1 Awareness of nuisance claim option 
The information contained on the property files has revealed a limited awareness by potential 
plaintiffs of the tort of nuisance as an option available to resolve the nuisance situation. The 
potential plaintiff regarding 11 Darwin Street obliquely referred to other courses of action available, 
but did not specify what they may be.111 The potential plaintiffs of 22 Ghuznee Street were clearly 
determined to resolve the matter and applied pressure on the WCC to address the situation but 
stopped short of threatening private legal action against the emission of noise from the cafe 
below.112
Private nuisance is only mentioned once in the files. The reference was made in correspondence 
from a lawyer engaged by the WCC to advise on the matter of 11 Darwin Street. It simply advised 
that the tort was an option available for the complainant to pursue independently of the WCC.113
It must be noted that research has been limited to the files held by the WCC and GWC and that 
this may not necessarily provide a complete record of the situation. 
2 Reliance on local authorities 
It is also evident that the potential plaintiffs placed great reliance on the WCC and GWC to 
resolve the potential nuisance situation. At no stage did any of the potential plaintiffs prefer to act 
independently. In each case study, the potential plaintiff made a complaint to the WCC or GWC and 
waited until the matter was resolved. Often it took more than one complaint, as in the case of 22 
Ghuznee Street where the potential plaintiffs lodged 66 complaints over a period of less than two 
months.114 The owners of the apartment building adjacent to the fast food outlet in Cuba Street 
complained on at least ten occasions.115  
Reliance by potential plaintiffs on local authorities to resolve nuisance situations is not 
unexpected, given the low risks and costs presented by this option. However, as I explain later, 
private nuisance is constrained from providing even a backup role when a potential plaintiff is 
unable to rely on a local authority. So even if any of the potential plaintiffs had wanted to pursue a 
private nuisance claim, the tort may prove to be an unattractive option. 
  
111 11 Darwin Street, above n 110. 
112 22 Ghuznee Street, above n 108. 
113 11 Darwin Street, above n 110. 
114 22 Ghuznee Street, above n 108. 
115 290 Cuba Street (GWC file: Chicky's Charcoal Chicken). 
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3 Effectiveness of the Resource Management Act in addressing the nuisance situation 
In all the case studies except 11 Darwin Street, the potential nuisance situations were resolved 
without recourse to a private nuisance claim. The case studies demonstrate that the RMA 
enforcement mechanisms and remedies are capable of effectively ending a nuisance problem.  
A potential nuisance situation involving noise emissions can be quickly resolved without 
recourse to the tort of private nuisance because of the availability of objective noise assessment 
methods. This is best demonstrated in the case study of 60 Kingsford Street.  
At 60 Kingsford Street, the complaints lodged by the potential plaintiffs were supported by an 
officer's noise assessment. The officer measured the noise emissions from the factory at the property 
boundary and using the noise standards of the District Plan, judged them to be "unreasonable".116 
An abatement notice was issued against the potential defendant requiring action to reduce noise 
emissions to within the prescribed standards. After a short period, the potential nuisance situation 
was resolved through changes in the design of the factory. No further complaints regarding the 
factory have been received since.117
Odour emissions present a greater problem. There are no objective criteria to assess the level of 
unreasonableness of odour emissions. This can lead to a potential defendant claiming that the 
complaint is unduly sensitive, as in the case of 290 Cuba Street.118 Despite this, the nuisance 
situation at 48 Kemp Street was resolved within a short period of time (approximately six weeks).  
In the cases of 60 Kingsford Street and 48 Kemp Street, the process of achieving an end to the 
nuisance was very straightforward and was achieved over a short period of time. It took a longer 
period for 290 Cuba Street and 22 Ghuznee Street, four and six months respectively, but this period 
is most likely to be shorter than the time it would take to have a civil case heard. Civil remedies are 
generally recognised as being very costly and slow to obtain redress.119 Thus, despite the delays 
evidenced by two case studies, the RMA is likely to prove more attractive in terms of the time it 
takes to relieve the potential plaintiffs from the nuisance problem. 
For a situation such as 22 Ghuznee Street, where there are weaknesses in establishing the 
potential plaintiff's case, the RMA is an expedient option in addressing a nuisance problem. 
However, the RMA cannot provide damages for a potential plaintiff who has suffered material 
  
116 60 Kingsford Street (WCC: 304444). 
117 Since the file was last reviewed 13 June 2003. 
118 290 Cuba Street, above n 115. 
119 D J Berwick Resource Management Law Reform Group: Enforcement and Compliance Issues in Resource 
Management. Working Paper No 30 (Ministry of the Environment, Wellington, 1988) 50. 
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interference to the enjoyment of his or her property. This is likely to be the main reason why a civil 
action will be pursued, as demonstrated in the case of Davidson below.  
V THE PATH TOWARDS OBSOLESCENCE 
A The Recent Decision of Hawkes Bay Protein Limited v Davidson 
The case of Davidson was discussed in the review of case law but is worthy of further analysis. 
Instead of pointing towards a support role for private nuisance in protecting landowners from 
personal discomfort, Davidson highlights the limitations of the tort. These limitations combined 
with the expansive application of the RMA have had the effect of rendering private nuisance largely 
obsolete. 
The lawyer for the plaintiff in Davidson stated that the main reason why a nuisance action was 
undertaken was the remedies afforded by the common law, "namely recovery of a variety of 
categories of damages … made the process more attractive".120 The plaintiff had been forced to 
relocate their business, had sold their property at a significant loss, and had endured "noxious 
odours" for approximately six months.121 The RMA does not provide compensation to a plaintiff 
that is unrelated to avoiding, remedying, or mitigating an adverse effect on the environment.122 
Compensation is generally limited to instances where the applicant of an enforcement order has 
undertaken work to prevent environmental damage caused by the neighbours' activities, for example 
erosion protection works.123
Another reason given by the plaintiff's lawyer for pursuing this action was the ability of the 
plaintiff to "drive the process".124 The plaintiff was likely to have felt some exasperation with RMA 
enforcement procedures. Despite their complaints to the Hawkes Bay Regional Council, the 
successful prosecution of the defendants under the RMA for the breach of resource consent 
conditions did not occur until after the plaintiff had relocated their business.125 In the meantime, the 
Council had renewed the plant's discharge to air resource consent.126
Davidson provides a good example of the circumstances where the tort of nuisance is likely to 
be used in New Zealand. Such circumstances involve the failure of local authorities to protect the 
  
120 Mark Hammond, Solicitor, Tompkins Wake, the author (24 June 2003) email. 
121 Davidson v Hawkes Bay Protein Limited (2 June 2001) DC Nap 26/98, 4 para 15 Judge Willy. 
122 Resource Management Act 1991, s 314(1)(d). 
123 Auckland City Council v Sulenta (26 August 1994) Plan Trib AC66/94 Judge Sheppard. 
124 Mark Hammond, Solicitor, Tompkins Wake, the author (24 June 2003) email. 
125 Davidson, above n 121, 14 para 74. 
126 Davidson, above n 121, 15 para 77. 
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interests of adjacent property owners and the desire to recover damages for distress and loss caused 
by the nuisance.  
B Implications  
A critical assessment of Davidson reveals that its authority will limit the application of private 
nuisance, assisting the tort on its path towards obsolescence. Gendall J held that Judge Willy in the 
District Court had erred in equating "loss of enjoyment or amenity value in land" with personal 
injury and quashed the award for separate damages to Mr and Mrs Davidson.127 In doing so, 
Gendall J applied the judgment of Lord Hoffman in Hunter.  This judgment overruled Bone v Seale, 
which had previously equated damages for loss of amenity with personal injury.128  
The award for the loss in property value was also quashed. Gendall J referred to passages in 
Lord Hoffman's and Lord Berwick's judgments which offered obiter comment regarding the effect 
on the capital value of properties arising from a transitory nuisance.129 Gendall J held that in the 
case of a transitory nuisance, the capital value of a property would seldom be reduced.130 Moreover, 
he found that the diminution of the property's value could not be solely attributed to the existence of 
the nuisance.131
The most significant aspect of Gendall J's judgment is his finding that in a case involving a 
"nuisance of the kind that concerns interference of enjoyment of property through noise and noxious 
smells and the like, the primary remedy in most cases is an injunction."132 While damages were 
available for the "loss in amenity value of the property",133 Gendall J held that plaintiffs were 
required to mitigate their loss and that an injunction was a "reasonable and essential step" that they 
should have taken.134 Thus damages were reduced to reflect the plaintiff's failure to seek an 
injunction.135
Regardless of the merits of Gendall J's approach, Davidson has meant that the tort of nuisance 
has lost any remaining glimmer of attractiveness as a legal tool in personal discomfort cases. Not 
  
127 Davidson, above n 36, 11 para 51. 
128 Bone v Seale [1975] 1 WLR 797 (CA) Stephenson LJ cited in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd above n 7, 706 
(HL) Lord Hoffmann. 
129 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, above n 7, 696 Lord Berwick and 706 Lord Hoffman. 
130 Davidson, above n 36, 11 para 50. 
131 Davidson, above n 36, 10 para 48. 
132 Davidson, above n 36, 7 para 32. 
133 Davidson, above n 36, 8 para 38. 
134 Davidson, above n 36, 11 para 50. 
135 Davidson, above n 36, 14 para 58. 
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only are damages likely to be meagre if an injunction is not sought, but also seeking an injunction 
presents a great risk to a potential plaintiff as he or she must give an undertaking for damages to the 
defendant if the action fails.136 This presents a dilemma in circumstances such as in Davidson where 
the local authority has failed to act within a reasonable period of time to prevent the nuisance. As 
the lawyer for the plaintiffs explained, in response to the question of why the Davidsons did not 
seek an injunction:137
There was an element of commercial realism applied. Hawkes Bay Protein was a substantial company 
and had deep pockets. My client did not. The downside of obtaining an injunction, and failing 
substantively was huge and untenable. HB Protein would have potentially been able to sue for any losses 
whilst it was closed if we did not win the substantive action. 
The application of the tort to nuisances involving non-physical damage has been severely 
constrained by Davidson. There seems little point in a potential plaintiff incurring the substantial 
risk associated with a claim for an injunction, when the award of damages is unlikely to be 
beneficial. Fleming has observed that there is a trend to restrict damages to the impaired value of the 
land rather than personal impact, as exemplified by Lord Hoffman's judgment in Hunter, which 
"stands against current practice, besides undercutting valued personality interests."138 This 
development in private nuisance fails to take into account the impact that non-physical harm such as 
noise interference and noxious odours can have on people's lives.  
Thus, the potential plaintiff in a situation involving interference with the use and enjoyment of 
their property will rely on the RMA to provide relief. Generally, this should not pose a problem. As 
outlined earlier in this paper, the RMA provides a sound set of enforcement mechanisms to end the 
nuisance situation. In addition, local authorities, as indicated in the case studies above, are usually 
responsive to the needs of potential plaintiffs. However, complete reliance on the RMA to resolve 
personal discomfort claims is not desirable as the following section explains. 
VI AN OPPORTUNITY LOST? 
A Nothing Lost? 
Many people may claim that nothing is lost by the inability to use private nuisance as a legal 
tool for personal discomfort claims. In fact, it can be argued that this is desirable and that the tort of 
nuisance is incapable of being a useful legal tool in the protection of the neighbourhood amenity and 
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the environment generally. The statutory environmental management framework is clearly better 
suited to the management of environmental issues. As Lord Hoffman acknowledged in Hunter:139
[T]he planning system is, I think, a far more appropriate form of control, from the point of view of both 
the developer and the public, than enlarging the right to bring actions for nuisance at common law. It 
enables the issues to be debated before an expert forum. 
Moreover, as a practising RMA lawyer has commented, enforcement procedures under the 
RMA "will often be a cheaper and more expeditious" way of obtaining redress when compared to 
bringing a common law action.140  
B Costs of Disuse 
These arguments fail to recognise that many personal discomfort claims will fall outside the 
planning control processes and the RMA will fail to provide an adequate remedy. For instance, as in 
the case of Greenwood, a planning officer may not realise that a proposed building's glass verandah 
may generate significant glare and that it may seriously affect the comfort of the neighbouring 
landowners.141 Moreover, complete reliance on the RMA is only satisfactory when a local authority 
is able and willing to respond to end a nuisance situation. This is not always the case, as 
demonstrated by Davidson, where the local authority decided to extend the term of the resource 
consent despite the complaints it had received about the odour generated by the factory.142  
A potential plaintiff faced with a reluctant local authority is able to pursue the option of 
applying for an enforcement order from the Environment Court.143 However, this option will take 
time to be heard before the Court and will not provide any compensation.144 An interim 
enforcement order may achieve a quick end to a nuisance situation but the applicant will often need 
to make an undertaking regarding damages in order to compensate the defendant for any economic 
dislocation suffered.145 Thus a potential plaintiff may experience similar drawbacks under the RMA 
as he or she would under a civil claim but without the prospect of receiving damages. Unless a 
potential plaintiff is willing to take the risk of a private nuisance claim or an enforcement order 
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under the RMA, they may be left in a situation where there may be little they can do apart from 
leave.  
One of the main costs of the demise of private nuisance relates to the lack of compensation for 
personal discomfort claims. A landowner experiencing substantial and unreasonable interference 
with the use and enjoyment of his or her property as a result of the activities of a neighbour, is 
unable to obtain any compensation under the RMA. With regard to private nuisance, the precedent 
established by Gendall J in Davidson will mean that adequate compensation will only be awarded 
when a plaintiff has sought an injunction. Furthermore, compensation will not be awarded on the 
basis of personal injury but rather loss to the amenity value of the land. This development in private 
nuisance, which appears to have been initiated by Lord Hoffman in Hunter and applied in Davidson 
by Gendall J, should be subjected to debate. While it is outside the scope of this article to enter into 
such a debate, a few conclusions may be drawn. This development may have the desirable effect of 
defining the application of private nuisance and limiting unworthy personal discomfort claims, but it 
is likely to undermine the application of the tort by limiting the recovery of damages for non-
physical harm.  
There are other significant costs associated with the dominance of the RMA and the demise of 
private nuisance. The obligation of property owners not to cause a nuisance has shifted to local 
authorities. This has afforded a great deal of protection to potential defendants under the RMA 
while enlarging the legal liability of local authorities. 
From one perspective, the protection afforded to the activities of potential defendants means that 
society as a whole obtains the benefits of these activities (for example goods and services such as air 
travel and aggregate for roads). The use of the RMA to regulate land uses, particularly through the 
concept of reverse sensitivity, may protect some noxious activities from private nuisance claims. 
This may be a small cost to pay because society has a need for such activities.  
There is merit in this argument, but I cannot endorse it entirely. The costs of the tort of private 
nuisance being rendered redundant are significant. Individual property rights have been curtailed for 
the benefit of established land uses. Private nuisance has the ability to deliver creative remedies to 
resolve conflicts between competing land uses,146 but it has now been denied this role. Bad land use 
patterns could be allowed to persist because of the use of the concept of reverse sensitivity in 
planning. 
The Ports of Auckland decision is likely to bring about an increase in judicial review actions 
against local authorities regarding decisions on resource consent applications and the content of 
district and regional plans.147 As a result, local authorities are likely to become more cautious and 
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perhaps overly regulatory in order to avoid the burden of defending their actions in court. Potential 
defendants' legal liability will be reduced, but at a cost to the general ratepayer. At the same time, 
individual property owners are reliant on local authorities for protection against substantial and 
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of their property. 
The present position does not represent a desirable state of affairs. I accept that it is difficult to 
provide a resource management regime that does not incur some cost to private property owners in 
respect of the public interest. However, I think that some change is required.  
C Possible Solutions 
Gearty argues that the tort of private nuisance can be revitalised through internal 
modifications.148 In particular, he suggests the removal of the category of physical harm. Physical 
harm is more appropriately addressed by the tort of negligence and its removal from the ambit of 
nuisance would do away with the fault element that has crept into nuisance. Gearty argues that this 
strategic surrender would open the way for a "new slimmed down and efficient action which could 
then assume a far greater and more constructive role in the protection of the environment."149  
Unfortunately, only a passing reference was made to Gearty's suggestions in Hunter and it is 
difficult to ascertain whether private nuisance is likely to develop in this direction in the future.150 
Moreover it is likely to be some time before the House of Lords will address private nuisance again. 
It is questionable whether the change suggested by Gearty would have the desired effect in New 
Zealand. It does not address recent developments within the tort that constrain damages nor does it 
account for the dominant role played by the RMA.  
Private nuisance can only take on a robust complementary role to the RMA through changes to 
the content and application of the RMA. Removal of the application of the concept of reverse 
sensitivity would go a long way to rectifying the situation. I suggest that the rejection of this concept 
by the courts would be beneficial. It would avoid the current situation where local authorities protect 
potentially actionable nuisances.  
My suggestion may be wishful thinking because of the general acceptance by the Environment 
Court of the concept. However, while not specifically addressing reverse sensitivity, Rt Hon Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer, a key "author" of the RMA also argues for change in the application of the RMA. 
Palmer is very critical of the application of the RMA by the Environment Court and believes it 
  
148 Gearty, above n 2, 218. 
149 Gearty, above n 2, 218. 
150 Hunter, above n 7, 692. 
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represents the "narrow approach of the past".151  Palmer argues that a case needs to be brought to 
the Court of Appeal to refocus the application of the RMA.152  
The RMA has been subject to a nearly constant process of amendment since its enactment.153 
Debate still surrounds the content of the RMA. As noted earlier, some commentators on the RMA 
have argued that the broad definition of "environment" and its inclusion in the purpose of the RMA 
has resulted in its expansive application.154 It has been suggested that if the RMA is amended to 
exclude social and economic considerations from its purpose, then this may curtail its expansive 
application.155 This could mean that the ambit of regulation would be reduced to apply to activities 
that generate environmental effects in bio-physical and ecological terms, rather than a consideration 
of social and economic effects. Through this refocus, the RMA could no longer be legitimately 
applied to protect an established land use activity that generates adverse environmental effects but at 
the same time provides social and economic benefits.  Such change could open the way for the tort 
to play a complementary role to the RMA. So far, however, Parliament has resisted any such 
amendment to the RMA.  
Private nuisance may be also revitalised if the courts modify the strict approach of Davidson and 
Hunter regarding the treatment of damages for personal discomfort private nuisance claims. This 
could be achieved by reaffirming the decision of Bone v Seale to allow for damages to be awarded 
to reflect the full effect that the nuisance has had on a plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his or her 
property.156 While future developments in the tort cannot be ruled out, a refocused interpretation of 
the RMA by the courts, particularly in relation to reverse sensitivity, represents a more likely source 
of change in the near future. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Baragwananth J's declaration that "[t]he time should be long past when statute and common law 
were seen as occupying different planes" is apt.157 Private nuisance has been rendered ineffective by 
the RMA. The tort has been denied a role because local authorities make decisions under the RMA 
about which competing land uses will prevail. The RMA has dominated private nuisance to such an 
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extent that potential nuisance situations are allowed to continue, because the use of neighbouring 
land has been restricted.  
As the case of Davidson has demonstrated, the tool of private nuisance is mostly redundant in 
relation to personal discomfort claims. Case studies have shown that this does not matter in the 
majority of nuisance situations because the RMA is able to adequately address the nuisance. 
However, the costs of the disuse of the tort are significant. There will be situations where potential 
plaintiffs cannot get relief under the RMA. In addition, compensation for significant discomfort is 
unlikely to be forthcoming. Another cost is that local authorities will end up bearing the burden of 
increased legal responsibility in ensuring that a nuisance situation does not arise in the first place. 
Whether the tort will ever re-emerge as a useful tool to assist in personal discomfort claims 
depends on the development of the RMA, such is the extent of the RMA's dominant role in 
environmental law. A debate regarding the cost of the demise of private nuisance in the face of the 
regulatory expansiveness of the RMA is desirable.  
 
